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Vulnerability record · CVE-2026-72196 · published 15 August 2026

CVE-2026-72196: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[]…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()'s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries: t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; } find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dp's allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch ("fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion", <[email protected]>) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path's memmove(&dp->vcn, ...) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [[email protected]: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts]

8.4 CVSS 3.1 High EPSS 0.20% · top 91.7% Received
8.4CVSS 3.1 base score
0.20%EPSS exploitation probability, 30 days
NoNot in CISA KEV
0Affected product versions listed by NVD
6References
17 Aug 2026Last modified by NVD

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()'s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries: t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; } find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dp's allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch ("fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion", <[email protected]>) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path's memmove(&dp->vcn, ...) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [[email protected]: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts]

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

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Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database (record CVE-2026-72196), CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS (scores of 2026-09-26). This page is refreshed as NVD updates the record.