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Vulnerability record · CVE-2026-64550 · published 27 July 2026

CVE-2026-64550: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame …

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path. The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out of bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413) __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96) rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ... Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too. The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame shorter than the header.

7.3 CVSS 3.1 High EPSS 0.17% · top 94.7% Received
7.3CVSS 3.1 base score
0.17%EPSS exploitation probability, 30 days
NoNot in CISA KEV
0Affected product versions listed by NVD
8References
17 Aug 2026Last modified by NVD

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path. The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out of bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413) __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96) rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ... Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too. The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame shorter than the header.

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H

References

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Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database (record CVE-2026-64550), CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS (scores of 2026-09-28). This page is refreshed as NVD updates the record.