CVE-2026-45321: TanStack npm packages published with credential-stealing malware via CI/CD chain

Automated analysis

Generated by VULONE's analysis model from the NVD record, CISA KEV and EPSS data on 17 September 2026. Confidence: high.

critical priorityCVSS 9.6, active KEV listing with ransomware use, and a confirmed supply-chain compromise of widely used packages make this an urgent patching and credential-rotation case.

What it is

Eighty-four malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* npm packages were published on 2026-05-11 using the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, without modifying the publish workflow. The attacker chained a pull_request_target misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork-to-base trust boundary, and runtime extraction of the OIDC token from the runner process. Because the packages were published under a trusted identity, downstream installs would pull credential-stealing malware.

Impact

Anyone installing an affected package version receives credential-stealing malware, giving the attacker access to secrets and credentials in the installer's environment. The trusted publish path also undermines normal supply-chain trust signals.

Attack surface

Reached through the npm registry: victims install a malicious package version, so exploitation requires the victim to pull the affected release (UI:R in the vector). The attacker side required no authentication to the npm registry, abusing the CI/CD trusted-publisher binding instead.

Exploitation

CISA added this to KEV on 2026-05-27 with a 2026-06-10 due date and flags known ransomware campaign use; EPSS is 0.02342 (82.8th percentile). References are tagged Exploit and Vendor Advisory, indicating public exploitation detail exists.

What to do

• Remove or pin away from the 84 malicious @tanstack/* versions and reinstall from known-good releases.
• Rotate any credentials, tokens, or secrets exposed to environments where affected versions were installed.
• Audit GitHub Actions workflows for pull_request_target misconfigurations and restrict cache scope across fork/base boundaries.
• Harden OIDC trusted-publisher bindings and monitor npm publish events for unexpected versions.
• Follow CISA KEV required actions and BOD 22-01 guidance for affected cloud services.

Detection

• Search lockfiles and build logs for the 42 affected @tanstack/* packages and the two malicious versions per package published 2026-05-11 19:20-19:26 UTC.
• Monitor npm registry and CI publish logs for unexpected version publishes under trusted-publisher identities.
• Hunt for outbound credential exfiltration or unusual process memory access on GitHub Actions runners.
• Review GitHub Actions cache writes crossing fork-to-base boundaries for poisoning attempts.

This assessment is produced automatically and is not human-reviewed. Verify against the vendor advisory before acting on it.