Vulnerability record · CVE-2025-39958 · published 9 October 2025
CVE-2025-39958: Linux kernel vulnerability
Linux · Linux Kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat() fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the hypervisor is concerned. Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device() fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() because attaching to the default domain must never fail. With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up the device. This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the link. Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they apply to all PCI instructions.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat() fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the hypervisor is concerned. Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device() fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() because attaching to the default domain must never fail. With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up the device. This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the link. Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they apply to all PCI instructions.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
1 vulnerable configurations from NVD's CPE data, grouped by vendor and product.
References
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Related vulnerabilities
Same products first, then exploited flaws of the same weakness class.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database (record CVE-2025-39958), CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS (scores of 2026-09-27). This page is refreshed as NVD updates the record.
