CVE-2023-25157: GeoServer OGC filter SQL injection via CQL and PostGIS datastore

Automated analysis

Generated by VULONE's analysis model from the NVD record, CISA KEV and EPSS data on 18 September 2026. Confidence: high.

critical priorityCVSS 9.8 with network reachability, no authentication and no user interaction, combined with a very high EPSS probability, makes this an urgent patch target.

What it is

GeoServer supports the OGC Filter expression language and CQL through WFS, WMS and WCS, and mishandles certain filter constructs when a PostGIS datastore is used. This allows SQL injection into backend queries, which matters because GeoServer is commonly internet-facing and the flaw is trivially reachable without credentials.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL into the PostGIS database, potentially reading, altering or deleting spatial and non-spatial data and, depending on database privileges, executing database functions. Full loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the backend data is possible.

Attack surface

Reached over the network through GeoServer's OGC endpoints (WFS, WMS, and WCS for ImageMosaic coverages) by sending crafted filter or CQL expressions. No authentication or user interaction is required per the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N).

Exploitation

Not listed in CISA KEV and no ransomware usage is documented, but EPSS is very high at 0.852 (99.7th percentile), indicating strong likelihood of exploitation. References are limited to the vendor advisory and patch commit, with no public exploit tag in the record.

What to do

• Upgrade GeoServer to 2.21.4 or 2.22.2 as advised by the vendor.
• If upgrade is not possible, disable the PostGIS Datastore 'encode functions' setting to mitigate strEndsWith, strStartsWith and PropertyIsLike misuse.
• Enable the PostGIS DataStore 'preparedStatements' setting to mitigate FeatureId misuse.
• Restrict network exposure of GeoServer OGC endpoints to trusted clients and place them behind authentication where feasible.
• Run the PostGIS datastore account with least privilege to limit the impact of successful injection.

Detection

• Inspect GeoServer and reverse-proxy access logs for OGC requests containing SQL metacharacters, UNION, stacked queries, or unusual CQL/filter syntax.
• Monitor PostGIS query logs for malformed or unexpected SQL originating from the GeoServer application account.
• Alert on anomalous request patterns to WFS, WMS and WCS endpoints, especially unauthenticated bursts from single sources.
• Check GeoServer configuration for the PostGIS encode functions and preparedStatements settings to confirm mitigations are applied.

This assessment is produced automatically and is not human-reviewed. Verify against the vendor advisory before acting on it.